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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1924 
 ___________ 
 
 ALOYSIOUS ALLIE CONTEH, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
    Respondents 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A029-850-629) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Robert P. Owens  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 23, 2011 
 Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: November 23, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Aloysious Allie Conteh petitions for review of an order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s 
(“IJ”) final removal order.  We will deny the petition for review. 
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I. 
 Because the parties are familiar with the history and facts of the case, we will 
recount the events in summary fashion.  Conteh, a native and citizen of Sierra Leone, was 
admitted to the United States on December 7, 1988, as a non-immigrant visitor with 
authorization to remain for six months.  Conteh overstayed his visitor’s visa, and in 
October 1993 he was served with an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) and charged as 
deportable.    
 Conteh conceded deportability, but sought asylum and related relief.  In February 
1996, the IJ denied Conteh asylum, but granted him voluntary departure.  Conteh 
appealed to the BIA.  Due to an inability to locate or recreate the record of the 
Immigration Court proceedings, the BIA administratively closed Conteh’s case in 2002.  
In 2004, the BIA remanded the case to the IJ on the Government’s motion for a de novo 
hearing on the merits, and in 2006 the IJ granted Conteh asylum.  The Government 
appealed, and the BIA held Conteh was ineligible for asylum, but remanded the case for 
the IJ to consider whether to grant Conteh voluntary departure.  The IJ denied voluntary 
departure.  Conteh appealed, filed a motion to remand, and argued he was eligible for 
suspension of deportation.
1
  In August 2008, the BIA granted Conteh’s motion to remand.         
 Before the IJ, Conteh argued that the “stop-time” provision, enacted by the Illegal 
                                                 
1
 Former section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provided that a 
non-permanent resident could apply for discretionary suspension of deportation if he 
could show, among other things, continuous physical presence in the United States for 
the seven years preceding his application (or ten years, if he was deportable for certain 
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Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), and codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(d),  would be impermissibly retroactive if applied to his request for 
suspension of deportation.
2
  The IJ disagreed, and held Conteh was ineligible for 
suspension of deportation because his receipt of the OSC in 1993 stopped the time 
accrual of continuous physical presence.  Conteh appealed to the BIA, renewing his 
argument that the stop-time rule was impermissibly retroactive.  The BIA rejected the 
retroactivity argument and held that Conteh was ineligible for suspension of deportation 
because he could not establish the required seven years of continuous physical presence.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (repealed).  Conteh filed a timely petition for review.  
II. 
 Conteh argues in his brief that (1) the BIA’s application of the stop-time rule is 
impermissibly retroactive; (2) even if the stop-time provision is applied, he has 
established sufficient physical presence to qualify for suspension of deportation; and (3) 
his conviction does not render him ineligible for suspension of deportation.  Conteh’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
criminal offenses).  INA § 244(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (repealed 1996)] 
2
 The “stop-time” provision  terminated the accumulation of continuous physical 
presence “when the alien is served a notice to appear.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d); see 
generally Pinho v. INS, 249 F.3d 183, 188 (3d Cir. 2001).  Section 309(c)(5) of IIRIRA 
provided that the stop-time provisions “shall apply to notices to appear issued before, on 
or after the date of the enactment of this Act.”  However, that section did not specifically 
refer to “Orders to Show Cause,” which is the means by which deportation proceedings 
were initiated before the enactment of IIRIRA.  Pinho, 249 F.3d at 187.  The Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (“NACARA”), Pub. L. No. 105-
100, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997) clarified that the stop-time provisions “shall apply to orders to 
show cause . . . issued before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.”  111 
Stat. 2160, 2196; Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 229-30 (3d Cir. 2007).  
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first argument fails based on our holdings in other cases that imposition of the stop-time 
provision is not impermissibly retroactive.  We also reject Conteh’s argument that he has 
met the physical presence requirement.  Because Conteh has not accrued the required 
continuous physical presence, we need not reach Conteh’s argument that his conviction 
does not prevent him from eligibility for suspension of deportation. 
 In Pinho, we applied the familiar analysis of Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 
U.S. 244 (1994), and held that the plain meaning of IIRIRA and NACARA “establishe[d] 
Congress’s intent to apply the stop-time rule to all cases, including those pending”3 as of 
IIRIRA’s enactment.  249 F.3d at 188.  Under Landgraf, where Congress’s intent to apply 
a statute retroactively is clear, the presumption against retroactivity does not apply.  
Pinho, 249 F.3d at 188.  We further held that retroactive application of the stop-time rule 
to applications for suspension of deportation does not violate an applicant’s due process 
rights because it does not impair any vested rights.  See Pinho, 249 F.3d at 188-89.  
Conteh argues that the reasoning of Pinho is no longer valid because it was decided 
before INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).  In St. Cyr, however, the Supreme Court 
considered whether Congress’s repeal of INA § 212(c) was impermissibly retroactive as 
applied to aliens who pleaded guilty to crimes that made them deportable but who 
otherwise would have been eligible for a § 212(c) waiver at the time of their plea.  Id. at 
315-26.  The Court held that Congress’s intentions concerning whether the repeal of 
                                                 
3
 Conteh did not apply for suspension of deportation until 2009, well after the passage of 
IIRIRA; thus, the provisions of IIRIRA arguably were not applied to him retroactively at 
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§ 212(c) relief was to be applied retroactively was ambiguous, and that the statute 
imposed an impermissible retroactive effect on certain aliens.  Id.  Although the Court in 
St. Cyr found certain portions of the IIRIRA ambiguous, the Court made no comment 
regarding IIRIRA § 309(c)(5), at issue here.  In fact, that section, which provides that the 
stop-time provision “shall apply to notices to appear issued before, on, or after the date of 
the enactment of this Act,” is remarkably similar to other provisions of IIRIRA that the 
Court in St. Cyr found unambiguous.  See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 319 and n 43 (citing 
several sections of IIRIRA that contain “before, on, or after” language).  Conteh’s case 
has nothing to do with eligibility for a § 212(c) waiver, and St. Cyr does not somehow 
overrule Pinho.  
  Moreover, this Court’s decisions since St. Cyr make clear that the relevant holding 
of Pinho still stands.  See Arca-Pineda v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 527 F.3d 101, 107 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (relying on Pinho to reject a due process challenge to the retroactive 
application of the stop-time rule); Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 492 F.3d 226, 
230 (3d Cir. 2007) (relying in part on the validity of Pinho in holding that 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1229b(d)(1)(B)—which provides that the commission of certain crimes stops the 
clock—applies retroactively in cases where aliens seek suspension of deportation).  
Accordingly, Conteh’s argument is meritless.  
Conteh next argues that even if the stop-time rule applies and the clock stops upon 
service of the OSC, the clock should start running again if there are delays in immigration 
                                                                                                                                                             
all. 
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proceedings not attributable to the alien.  Additionally, he argues that the OSC should not 
be considered served until the Immigration Court receives it.  In rejecting Conteh’s 
argument, the BIA explained that service of the OSC ends the period for accruing 
continuous physical presence, and that once that event occurs, the clock cannot be 
restarted.  The BIA cited In re Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1236, 1241 (BIA 
2000), to support its conclusion.  In Briseno-Flores, this Court concluded that the holding 
of Mendoza-Sandino—i.e., that once the clock is stopped, it cannot be restarted—is 
entitled to Chevron
4
 deference.  Briseno-Flores, 492 F.3d at 231.  Conteh was admitted to 
the United States on December 7, 1988, and, according to Conteh, the Immigration Court 
received the OSC on April 20, 1994.  Applying the Mendoza-Sandino rule, even if 
Conteh is correct that the clock did not stop until the Immigration Court received the 
OSC, he still only accrued a bit over five years of physical presence—well short of the 
required seven years.  Conteh attempts to add on the time period of February 22, 2002 to 
March 9, 2004, the time during which his case was administratively closed because the 
record of proceedings was missing.  Conteh provides no support for his contention that 
the period of “continuous” presence can be restarted due to delays in the administrative 
proceedings, and, as noted, we held in Briseno-Flores that once service of the OSC stops 
the accrual of physical presence, the “clock” cannot be restarted.  492 F.3d at 231; see 
also Pinho, 249 F.3d at 189, n.5 (denying petition for review despite fact that petitioners 
would have been eligible for suspension of deportation if not for significant delay that 
                                                 
4
 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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resulted in BIA decision occurring after stop-time rule went into effect). 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
